題    目：Guarantor Financing in a Four-party Supply Chain with Leadership Influence

演 講 人：周偉華，浙江大學意昂2官网教授

主 持 人：鎮  璐，意昂2教授

時    間：2018年5月31日（周四），下午14:00

地    點：校本部東區意昂2官网420室

主辦單位：意昂2🚴🏿‍♂️、意昂2青年教師聯誼會

演講人簡介🐂：

香港科技大學工業工程與物流管理博士,浙江大學意昂2官网教授🫄、博士生導師，斯坦福大學訪問學者，教育部新世紀優秀人才，浙江大學求是青年學者，浙江省之江青年學者。

現任浙江大學意昂2官网副院長、浙江大學數據分析和管理國際研究中心主任2️⃣。

長期從事決策分析與運營管理研究，相關研究成果在國際管理科學頂級刊物《Operations Research》發表，在國內外發表學術論文20余篇👉🏿。主持國家自然科學基金項目4項📮🫱🏿，國家部委、各級政府及企業項目20余項。

演講內容簡介：

Recent years have seen guarantor financing growing rapidly in developing countries, where small firms do not have sufficient creditworthiness to secure bank loans by themselves. However, to date, no paper has studied the efficacy of guarantor financing in a supply chain context. This paper investigates both manufacturer guarantor financing (MGF) and third-party logistics (3PL) guarantor financing (LGF) in a four-party supply chain, featuring a manufacturer, a 3PL, and a retailer, and a bank. Either the manufacturer or 3PL can act as the guarantor of the retailer when it applies credit from the bank. Two different leadership structures are investigated: simultaneous game where the manufacturer and 3PL simultaneously make their decisions and manufacturer leadership Stackelberg game where the manufacturer and 3PL sequentially make their decisions.

Under the simultaneous game, all firms prefer guarantor financing compared to traditional bank financing when the supply chain is cost efficient and expected efficient sales under guarantor financing is attractive . Furthermore, the retailer and the supply chain have no preference between MGF and LGF; while both manufacturer and 3PL prefer the other to be the guarantor.  Under the Stackelberg game, all firms still prefer guarantor financing with conditions. Meanwhile, all firms including 3PL itself prefer 3PL to be the guarantor. Furthermore, our analysis shows that a longer decision hierarchy (i.e., a Stackelberg game rather than a simultaneous game) can be more effective for all firms under guarantor financing with conditions, while under bank financing all firms except the manufacturer prefer the simultaneous game. By further analyzing different cost structures, pricing mechanism and level of initial capital, we find most of the conclusion mentioned above remains true but with more sophisticated conditions.  All these findings enhance our understanding of the value of guarantor financing in a supply chain.

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